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Abstract
Television (TV) stations forego millions of dollars of advertising revenues by air-
ing tune-ins (preview advertisements) for their upcoming programs. In this paper,
I analyze the equilibrium as well as welfare properties of tune-ins in a duopolistic
TV market that lasts for two periods. Importantly, each TV station is fully in-
formed about its own as well as its rivals program. Viewers receive information
via tune-ins, if any, or alternatively by sampling a program for a few minutes (and
switching across stations). I nd that equilibrium tune-in decisions do not neces-
sarily depend on TV stationsknowledge of their rivals program. In this case, the
opportunity costs of tune-ins could be so high that a regime without any tune-ins
may be socially better. However, when tune-ins depend on both of the upcoming
programs, it is possible that they enhance welfare by helping viewers avoid some of
the ine¢ cient program sampling they would otherwise do in a regime without any
tune-ins.
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JEL Classication: D83, L13, M37.
I would like to thank the coeditor Régis Renault and two anonymous referees for many helpful
and productive suggestions. I also would like to thank Simon Anderson, Maxim Engers, Paolo Garella,
Bilgehan Karabay and Kresimir Zigic as well as seminar and conference participants at the University
of Auckland, CERGE-EI, University of Milan, University of Virginia, EEA-ESEM (Budapest, 2007),
EARIE (Valencia, 2007), IIOC (Boston, 2013), ZEW Conference on the Economics of ICT (Mannheim,
2013), EARIE (Evora, 2013) and Jornadas de Economia Industrial (Segovia, 2013) for useful comments.
All errors are my own.
yNational Research University Higher School of Economics, Myasnitskaya 20, 101000, Moscow, Rus-
sia; and CERGE-EI (a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Academy
of Sciences of the Czech Republic), Prague, Czech Republic (e-mail: lcelik@hse.ru).
1 Introduction
In this paper, I analyze the provision of tune-ins (preview advertisements for broadcasters
upcoming programs) in an oligopolistic television (TV) market. Tune-ins constitute an
important component of TV advertising. Anand and Shachar [1998] report that three
major network stations in the U.S. devoted approximately 2 of 12 minutes of non-program
time to tune-ins in 1995. More recently, CBS ran 42 tune-ins during the 2013 Super Bowl,
which made up approximately 20.6% of all advertising time (source: Kantar Media).
This implies quite a large opportunity cost for CBS given that the average price for a
30-second commercial was approximately $4 million. Table 1 presents the percentage of
total advertising time allocated to tune-ins during Super Bowl over 2006-2010, and the
corresponding (approximate) opportunity cost incurred by the broadcasting station.
Year Time (mm:ss) % of all ad time Value (million)
2006 7:20 16.6% $36.7
2007 9:35 22.2% $45.7
2008 8:35 19.0% $46.4
2009 7:10 15.9% $43.0
2010 8:15 17.2% $49.1
Table 1. Network self-promotion in the Super Bowl. (source: Kantar Media)
Why would TV stations pass up the opportunity of earning several millions of dollars
from sponsor advertisements (henceforth, ads) and instead choose to promote their own
programs? Generally speaking, tune-ins are informative ads that help viewers better
evaluate the expected utility of watching the promoted program.1 Upon seeing a tune-in,
some viewers will realize a high match and watch the promoted program rather than
switch to another station. Similarly, some will realize a bad match and switch away.
Holding constant the aggregate audience size, I refer to the net increase in a stations
audience share as a result of this two-way ow as the business-stealing role of tune-
ins. A tune-in may also persuade some viewers to stay tuned rather than switch o¤
completely. In this case, the tune-in has a demand creationrole. Overall, these two
factors determine the e¤ectiveness of a tune-in and whether the increase it creates in
1Although an individual can turn to TV schedules that appear in conventional magazines or in online
websites, an important fraction of viewers remain imperfectly informed due to the costs associated with
information acquisition. Moreover, individuals have limited memories.
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total viewership is enough to o¤set the opportunity cost it involves. In fact, a week after
the 2013 Super Bowl, Nielsen announced that CBS took 8 of the 10 top spots in ratings,
thus justifying to some extent CBSs strategy of airing a high number of tune-ins.
The TV industry has some distinctive features. First, existence of TV programs is a
priori known to everyone. Therefore, a TV stations decision to air or not to air a tune-in
must account for the possible inferences its viewers will draw in the absence of a tune-
in. Second, TV stations are generally well-informed about their rivalsprograms. This
means that their tune-ins (or lack thereof) may convey indirect information about their
rivalsupcoming programs. Third, TV programs are typically not only vertically but
also horizontally di¤erentiated. In other words, there is generally no consensus among
viewers about the superiority of any two programs. Forth, before making a nal decision,
viewers can switch across TV stations and learn the attributes of a program by sampling
it for a few minutes. However, this typically results in a lower ex-post utility than what
could have been attained if the viewer watched the same program (or chose the outside
activity) from the very beginning. And fth, by placing a programs tune-in in other
similar programs, TV stations can target viewers based on their preferences. In this
sense, tune-ins reach a non-random group of viewers.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the properties as well as the welfare impli-
cations of equilibrium tune-in provision, while capturing some of the above features of
the TV market. I construct a simple Hotelling [1929] model with a continuum of view-
ers distributed along the unit line with respect to their ideal programs. There are two
TV stations each airing two consecutive programs. Viewers know the earlier programs
in both stations but are uncertain about the locations of the upcoming programs. TV
stations, on the other hand, are fully informed about their own as well as their rivals up-
coming program (and viewers know that the stations know them). Each TV station may
promote its upcoming program to its rst-period audience by airing a tune-in. Viewers
may alternatively learn the attributes of a program by briey sampling it (and switching
back and forth between stations when desired). The sampling process entails a positive
opportunity cost viewers incur a disutility for any missed portion of the nal choice
they make. Thus, while tune-ins involve positive opportunity costs for TV stations, they
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help viewers make better-informed decisions and lower their sampling costs.
The main ndings can be summarized as follows. First, provided that the opportunity
cost of airing a tune-in is not too high, the business-stealing motive alone is generally
su¢ cient to ensure that TV stations air tune-ins in equilibrium. Second, even if TV
stations are fully informed about their rivals upcoming program, their tune-in decisions
do not necessarily depend on this information. When they do depend, however, TV
stations air fewer tune-ins on average and viewers make interim-stage inferences not only
for the upcoming program of the station they watch but also for that of the other station.
As a result, the resulting aggregate welfare is generally higher compared to when tune-
in decisions are made independently. Third, when tune-in decisions do not depend on
the knowledge of the rivals program, the opportunity costs TV stations incur by airing
tune-ins could be so high that a regime without any tune-ins may be socially better. In
other words, it may be welfare-improving if the two stations shared a common ownership
or if they coordinated on airing no tune-ins. However, when tune-ins depend on both
upcoming programs, they may enhance welfare by helping viewers avoid some of the
ine¢ cient program sampling they would otherwise do in a regime without any tune-ins.
The sampling process I adopt plays an important role in the analysis. Broadly speak-
ing, it is a dynamic learning process in which a decision-maker chooses among one certain
(the outside option) and two uncertain (the second-period TV programs) alternatives un-
til she nds the optimal time to stop. This approach is closely related to multi-armed
bandit problems in which a single decision-maker sequentially experiments among a xed
set of alternatives (see, among others, Rothschild [1974] and Bergemann and Valimaki
[1996]). In my model, each uncertain alternative (i.e., each TV program) fully unfolds as
the decision-maker (i.e., the viewer) experiments it for a xed amount of time, there are
increasing returns to engaging in an alternative (viewers do not derive any utility from
watching only a portion of a TV program) and time is nite. Many real-life decision
problems resemble this framework. Examples include a student choosing from a set of
elective courses at the beginning of a semester, a group of tourists bar-hopping to nd
the most enjoyable pub, or a gambler trying to nd the bestslot machine in a casino.
In all of these cases, the alternatives are mutually exclusive within a given period, so
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experimentation involves a positive opportunity cost. Moreover, as the time is nite,
experimentation will potentially alter the relative utility of the current choice versus the
other alternatives an important feature of the sampling process I adopt.
Despite the peculiar features of the TV market, the main elements of the analysis can
be extended to other markets, especially to those that are segmented with respect to con-
sumer preferences. For instance, one may look at other media markets that share similar
features with the TV market (e.g., radio market, market for movies, internet news por-
tals). One may also extend the analysis to nite-horizon dynamic learning environments
or to multi-armed bandit problems with competing rms. For instance, a students choice
of which elective courses to take may be highly inuenced by the information professors
provide in their rst classes. Similarly, most products carry information on their packages
and the level of information provided is controlled by rms. In a model with exogenous
market segmentation (say, due to brand loyalty), rms can inuence consumersexperi-
mentation behavior by choosing how much information to provide. Although my model
does not involve any pricing, the main insights would be useful in analyzing this prob-
lem. Bergemann and Valimaki [1996] study a single consumer sequentially experimenting
among a set of products sold by di¤erent sellers. While their focus is on oligopoly pricing
and how it interacts with the learning process, one may consider analyzing optimal ad-
vertising strategies in a similar setup. To the best of my knowledge, there are no papers
that analyze this problem in an oligopolistic environment. Saak [2012] studies a similar
problem in a monopolistic environment where the rm sells a new experience good over
time to a population of heterogeneous forward-looking buyers.2
This paper contributes to the literature on veriable information disclosure and di-
rectly informative advertising. Balestrieri and Izmalkov [2011], Celik [2014] and Sun
[2011] focus on the disclosure of horizontal attributes in a Hotelling framework. In con-
trast to the celebrated information unravelingresult of the quality disclosure literature,
these papers show that equilibria typically involve partial information revelation when
2The current analysis may also be helpful in studying a model of electoral competition whereby
political candidates advertise through media (which can be quite segmented in terms of the political
attitudes of its audience) before the electoral voting takes place. Janssen and Teteryatnikova [2015]
approach this problem in a two-candidate setup. In their analysis, there is no media and disclosure
reaches everyone. In this sense, my approach is complementary to theirs.
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products have horizontal attributes.3 Koessler and Renault [2012] study a more general
model that allows for both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation, and identify the con-
ditions under which the fully-revealing equilibrium is the unique outcome. Moreover,
they nd that full revelation is always an equilibrium if product and consumer types are
independently distributed. None of these papers consider consumer search. Anderson
and Renault [2006] allow for search in a random-utility model in which they analyze the
choice of advertising content and the information disclosed to consumers. They show
that a monopolist advertises only product information, price information, or both, and
prefers to convey only limited product information if possible.
Turning to competition, Anderson and Renault [2009] analyze disclosure of horizontal
attributes in a duopoly setting, allowing for comparative advertising whereby rms can
advertise their rivals product characteristics. They nd that, if comparative advertising
is used in equilibrium, then it will be used by the rm with a lower intrinsic quality.
They also show that even though comparative advertising benets consumers, it may
lower the aggregate welfare. Janssen and Teteryatnikova [2014] focus on equilibrium
properties in a Hotelling setting with no intrinsic quality di¤erences. They nd that full
information disclosure is the unique outcome only if pricing and disclosure decisions are
made simultaneously, and comparative advertising is allowed. Otherwise, a large set of
non-disclosure equilibria exist. Meurer and Stahl [1994] analyze the welfare properties of
informative advertising in a duopoly model à la Grossman and Shapiro [1984], where a
fraction of buyers are uninformed about the product characteristics. Anand and Shachar
[2009] consider a similar setup in which a rm can advertise only through one or both
of two available media channels and consumer preferences over product attributes are
perfectly correlated with their choice of media channel. However, ads are noisy in their
analysis, meaning that consumers may get the wrong idea from an ad.4
To the best of my knowledge, there are no previous theoretical studies of tune-ins.
There are, however, empirical studies that analyze the e¤ects of tune-ins on viewers
3The pioneering works on veriable quality disclosure are Grossman [1981], Grossman and Hart
[1980] and Milgrom [1981]. They all reach the information unravelingresult in a monopolistic setting:
quality is fully revealed in all perfect Bayesian equilibria as long as there is a credible and costless way
of communicating it. There is a large literature that o¤ers various extensions to this framework. See
Dranova and Jin [2010] for a recent survey on the subject.
4See Renault [2015] for an overview of the recent literature on advertising and veriable disclosure.
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choices. Anand and Shachar [1998] estimate the di¤erential e¤ects of tune-ins on viewing
decisions for regular and special shows, and nd a signicant di¤erence. Moshkin and
Shachar [2002] consider the informational role of tune-ins in inducing viewers to continue
watching the same TV station (the so-called lead-ine¤ect) and propose a method to
identify it. Using a panel dataset on TV viewing, they nd strong evidence for this role
of tune-ins. Anand and Shachar [2011] consider tune-ins as noisy signals of program
attributes. They nd that while exposure to tune-ins improves the matching of viewers
and programs, in some cases it decreases a viewers tendency to watch a program.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I introduce the main model
and characterize the equilibria. Section 3 argues when it may be welfare improving to
ban tune-ins. Section 4 discusses the ndings and concludes.
2 The Model
There are two TV stations, Y and Z, each airing two consecutive programs in two
consecutive time periods. The programs are characterized by their locations on the unit
interval [0; 1]. They are of the same length and have zero production costs. Each station
is fully informed about its own as well as its rivals program. There are A  2 time
slots during each program that can be used for non-program content, where A is an
exogenously given integer. I will henceforth refer to these as ads. Thus, the game in this
paper may be thought of as a subgame of a larger game where the choices of program
locations and the amount of non-program minutes have already been made.
There is a large number of advertisers that are willing to pay up to $p per viewer
reached for placing a commercial during a program in each period. Each commercial
is one time-slot long. In the rst period, each TV station may choose to air a tune-in
to promote its upcoming program. Production of a tune-in does not entail any costs.
I assume that a tune-in has the same length as a commercial. Each TV station splits
the available A ads during the rst program between commercials and tune-ins. Hence,
TV stations incur an opportunity cost for placing tune-ins. I assume that a TV station
5This paper is also related to the scarce literature on quality signaling with multiple senders when rms
have common knowledge of product qualities. For examples, see Fluet and Garella [2002], Hertzendorf
and Overgaard [2001] and Yehezkel [2008].
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cannot lie in a tune-in (i.e., each station is legally bound to advertise a preview of the
actual program) and that the tune-in is fully informative. The objective of each TV
station is to maximize its total advertising revenue, which equals the size of its audience
in each period times the per-viewer revenue it earns. Per-viewer revenue is (A  1)p if a
station airs a tune-in, and Ap if it does not.
On the other side of the market, there is a continuum of a unit mass of potential
viewers. They are uniformly distributed along the unit interval with respect to their ideal
programs. A viewer who is located at  2 [0; 1] obtains a net utility ut (; x) = vt j  xj
in period t = 1; 2 from watching a program located at x.6 Viewersideal programs stay
the same over the periods. Not watching TV yields zero benets.7
Since the main focus of this paper is on the optimal tune-in behavior of TV stations
and how this depends on their knowledge of the rivals upcoming program, I assume
that viewers have complete information about the rst programs, and for simplicity that
viewers with  2 [0; 1
2
] watch Y and viewers with  2 (1
2
; 1] watch Z in the rst period.
This would be the case, for instance, if period 1 had a relatively large v1, station Y aired
a program located at 0 and Z aired a program located at 1. Since the rst-period viewer
behavior is xed, I drop the t subscript from now on, and thus u (; x) = v   j  xj
measures the second period utility. Viewers do not know where on the unit interval the
second programs are located at. Denote the location of the second program of station Y
with y and that of Z with z. I assume that prior beliefs for y and z are independent and
are each given by a discrete uniform density function with three equally likely locations,
0, 1
2
and 1. Viewers know that the stations know the location of their own as well as
their rivals program. To ease notation, let qj (y; z) be a binary variable that summarizes
the tune-in strategy of station j, j = Y , Z, where qj (y; z) = 1 if station j airs a tune-in
when the two programs are located at (y; z), and 0 otherwise.
A viewer makes a decision at each instance that maximizes her total utility. I al-
low viewers to switch between stations or switch o¤ completely whenever they wish so.
However, this comes at a cost. To model this costly switching process, I assume that
6Alternatively, vt can be interpreted as the quality of the period-t program.
7Given that the value of not watching TV is zero, the degree of disutility associated with a mismatch
can be captured by varying vt. Similarly, one can introduce nuisance costs associated with the amount
of non-program minutes. This, too, can be captured by varying vt.
7
the amount of time required to learn the true location of a program is constant and the
same for all programs and all viewers. Let k denote this amount of time. If a viewer
samples a program for k minutes and then decides to watch it until the end with no
further sampling, then she is able to enjoy the program fully. If, on the other hand, she
switches away (to the other station or switch o¤ completely) after k minutes, then she
will have missed the rst k minutes of her nal choice, and therefore will not receive the
full benet of doing it. In other words, sampling a program entails a positive opportunity
cost. For simplicity, I assume that each missed k minutes of a viewers nal choice lowers
the net utility of that choice by c > 0, and this is same for all options. I will henceforth
refer to it as the sampling cost. I assume that k is relatively short, and as such, c is
relatively small compared to v (to be more specic, I assume v > 2c).
The particular way I model program sampling o¤ers tractability for an otherwise
complicated process, and plays an important role in the analysis. Most importantly, the
opportunity cost of sampling is irreversible once a viewer chooses to engage in sampling,
and this alters the relative utility of the current choice versus the other options. This
means that some viewers may end up watching a program, which they would not choose
to watch under perfect information. As a result, when v is at an intermediate value
such that all viewers engage in sampling but not all watch TV at the end, the aggregate
audience size will be higher the more uncertainty viewers have about program attributes.
Similarly, for the same range of v, aggregate audience size will be increasing in c. As
described in the Introduction, the particular way I model the sampling process resembles
nite-horizon learning models in many ways. If there are increasing returns to engaging
in an activity, similar results would arise in these environments, too.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, Nature selects the values of y and z
independently from a discrete uniform density function with support

0; 1
2
; 1
	
. These
are observed by the TV stations but not by the viewers. In the rst period, viewers with
 2 [0; 1
2
] watch Y and those with  2 (1
2
; 1] watch Z.8 TV stations decide whether to
air a tune-in for their upcoming programs or not. Viewers update their beliefs based on
8In practice, a viewer can sample the other station in the rst period in the hope of seeing a tune-in,
the chances of which could be quite slim. However, since the same viewer can always sample the other
stations upcoming program in the second period and learn its location perfectly and since she incurs
the same sampling cost in either case, switching in the rst period is strictly dominated.
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whether or not they were exposed to a tune-in. The second programs start and viewers
decide on their sampling behavior. In case of indi¤erence, a viewer equally randomizes
between the two stations (this applies to both sampling and watching). Once viewers
program sampling is nalized, audience shares of the stations, and in turn the payo¤s
are realized. All aspects of the game are common knowledge. As a tie-breaking rule, I
assume that viewers choose to watch TV if they are indi¤erent between watching and
switching o¤, and stations choose not to air a tune-in if they are indi¤erent between
airing one and not airing any.
The equilibrium concept used is strong perfect Bayesian equilibrium (SPBE).9 I focus
on symmetric strategies whereby each TV station makes an optimal tune-in decision
taking as given its rivals program location and viewers behavior, and viewers make
optimal sampling and viewing decisions after observing the tune-in decision of the station
they have watched (and their inferences about the upcoming programs are correct). Most
importantly, beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path are identical across viewers. O¤-equilibrium
beliefs become important when a TV station airs a tune-in that was unanticipated by
viewers. The concept of SPBE does not impose any restrictions on how these beliefs are
formed. Given the common private information assumption, a deviation may potentially
be taken as an informative signal by viewers about the rival stations program.
2.1 Benchmark
I start with two benchmark situations: (i) perfect information about program attributes,
and (ii) incomplete information with no tune-ins. Although the rst one is a hypothetical
situation, it serves as a useful benchmark to observe the role of incomplete information.
The second one is a relevant situation because it may possibly arise as an equilibrium
outcome. Moreover, it will serve as an important benchmark for understanding the
optimal sampling behavior of viewers.
(i) Perfect information:
Under perfect information, viewers do not engage in sampling and there is no need for
tune-ins. Hence, all we need to determine is which station each viewer watches, and
9This concept follows from Fudenberg and Tirole [1991].
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then aggregate the viewership to reach the nal audience shares. Recall that the utility
of watching a program located at x for a viewer at  is u (; x) = v   j  xj. If, for
instance, y < z and (z   y) < 2v, then there will be a unique indi¤erent viewer located
at y+z
2
. Viewers with locations maxfy   v; 0g   < y+z
2
will watch program y while the
ones with locations y+z
2
<   minfz+ v; 1g will watch z. If y = z, then the two stations
equally share the viewers with  2 [maxfy   v; 0g;minfy + v; 1g]. The following table
presents the audience share for each station (the fraction of the population watching that
station) under full information, where, in each cell, the rst number indicates station Y
and the second one indicates station Z.
z = 0 z =1
2
z = 1
y = 0 min

v
2
; 1
2
	
;min

v
2
; 1
2
	
1
4
;1
4
+min

v; 1
2
	
min

v; 1
2
	
;min

v; 1
2
	
y =1
2
1
4
+min

v; 1
2
	
;1
4
min

v; 1
2
	
;min

v; 1
2
	
1
4
+min

v; 1
2
	
;1
4
y = 1 min

v; 1
2
	
;min

v; 1
2
	
1
4
;1
4
+min

v; 1
2
	
min

v
2
; 1
2
	
;min

v
2
; 1
2
	
Table 2. Audience shares of Y and Z under full information.
(ii) Incomplete information with no tune-ins:
This is the most natural benchmark to start with under incomplete information. When
tune-ins are not allowed, o¤-equilibrium beliefs are irrelevant, so we just need to focus on
viewersoptimal sampling/switching behavior. Without any new information provided,
viewers make their second-period sampling/watching decisions based fully on their prior
beliefs. Since their priors are symmetric across the two stations, if they decide to engage
in sampling, then they will pick randomly (with equal chances) one of the stations.
Given the symmetry, it su¢ ces to analyze the behavior of viewers with locations  2
0; 1
4

. Assume 1
4
< v+ c < 1
2
for now. First, take a viewer with  < 1
2
 v  c. Viewers in
this range would only watch a program located at 0. Even if the sampling cost is incurred,
turning TV o¤ is better for them than watching a program located at 1
2
or 1. Suppose
a viewer in this range samples one of the two upcoming programs, and it turns out to
be di¤erent than 0. Now that the rst k minutes are gone, sampling the other station
has an expected utility of 1
3
(v   c  ) + 2
3
( 2c). On the other hand, if she switches o¤
without sampling the other station, she would enjoy the outside option at a utility of
 c. Thus, she should engage in a second sampling if 1
3
(v   c  ) + 2
3
( 2c)   c, or
equivalently if v   2c. Evaluated at  = 1
2
 v c, this implies v  1
4
 c
2
. Hence, when
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v  1
4
+ c
2
, all viewers with  < 1
2
  v   c engage in a second sampling. Likewise, since
sampling lowers the relative utility of the remaining options equally, the expected utility
of engaging in the rst sampling is positive for exactly the same parameter values, i.e.,
if v  1
4
+ c
2
.10 When v < 1
4
+ c
2
, on the other hand, those viewers for whom v     2c
do engage in sampling (and a second sampling if the rst one is unsuccessful), while
 2  v   2c; 1
2
  v   c do not watch TV at all.
Now, take a viewer with  2 1
2
  v   c; 1
4

and suppose that this viewer samples
station Y . Again, assume 1
4
< v + c < 1
2
for now. If y = 0, she surely stays with Y since
this is her rst-best choice. If it turns out that y = 1
2
, she may also want to check out
station Z in the hope of nding z = 0. If she nds out z = 1, she would switch back to
station Y , because watching y = 1
2
is still better than switching o¤. If instead z = 1
2
,
then she would be indi¤erent between the two stations. Thus, the expected utility of
switching to Z when y = 1
2
is 1
3
(v   c  ) + 2
3
(v  c  1
2
+ ). This expression is greater
than the utility of staying with Y , v   (1
2
  ), when  < 1
4
  3c
2
. Thus, when y = 1
2
, it
is optimal to also sample Z for the viewers with locations 1
2
  v   c   < 1
4
  3c
2
. Note
that 1
2
  v  c  1
4
  3c
2
exactly when v  1
4
+ c
2
. Finally, if y = 1, the expected utility of
switching to Z is 1
3
(v   c  ) + 1
3
(v  c  1
2
+ ) + 1
3
( 2c) which equals 1
3
(2v  4c  1
2
).
This is greater than the utility of switching o¤,  c, when v  1
4
+ c
2
, which is again the
same condition. One also has to check if engaging in the rst sampling is optimal. As
before, given that it is optimal when v  1
4
+ c
2
to do a second sampling after seeing
y = 1
2
or 1, it must be optimal to do the rst sampling, too. When v < 1
4
+ c
2
, on the
other hand, viewers with  2 1
2
  v   c; 1
4

do not watch TV at all and instead take the
outside option from the beginning. This is exactly for the same reasons a viewer does
not choose to sample z after observing y = 1
2
or 1.
To summarize, when v < 1
4
+ c
2
, there is a non-empty set of initial Y -viewers,  2 
v   2c; 1
2
  v + 2c, who take the outside option from the beginning. A tune-in may
help the TV station persuade these viewers to stay tuned. The others engage in program
sampling and do so until they nd a good match. When v  1
4
+ c
2
, all viewers engage in
sampling. If the rst program sampled is within 1
4
+ 3c
2
units from the viewers location,
10The expected utility of the rst sampling is 13 (v   )+ 23

1
3 (v   c  ) + 23 ( 2c)

, which is positive
if and only if 59 [v     2c] > 0. This is the same condition as before.
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then she watches that program without any further sampling. Otherwise, she samples the
program at the other station, too (and switch o¤at the end if she cannot nd anything she
likes). In this case, the tune-in serves the business-stealing motive by deterring viewers
from switching to the other station. Table 3 presents the audience shares for v < 1
2
  c.11
z = 0 z = 1
2
z = 1
y = 0 v
2
  c; v
2
  c v   2c; 2 (v   2c) v   2c; v   2c
y = 1
2
2 (v   2c) ; v   2c v   2c; v   2c 2 (v   2c) ; v   2c
y = 1 v   2c; v   2c v   2c; 2 (v   2c) v
2
  c; v
2
  c
Table 3a. Audience shares of Y and Z with no tune-ins when v < 1
4
+ c
2
.
z = 0 z = 1
2
z = 1
y = 0 minfv+c;1g
2
; minfv+c;1g
2
1
4
; 1
4
+ v + c v + c; v + c
y = 1
2
1
4
+ v + c; 1
4
v + c; v + c 1
4
+ v + c; 1
4
y = 1 v + c; v + c 1
4
; 1
4
+ v + c minfv+c;1g
2
; minfv+c;1g
2
Table 3b. Audience shares of Y and Z with no tune-ins
when 1
4
+ c
2
 v < 1
2
  c.
It is important to highlight that incomplete information lowers the aggregate audience
size relative to perfect information when v is relatively small (i.e., when v < 1
4
+ c
2
), and
expands it as v gets relatively larger. When v is relatively small, some viewers who would
normally stay tuned under perfect information switch o¤ without any sampling because
of the uncertainty they face. When v is relatively large, on the other hand, all viewers
engage in sampling in equilibrium and some face the hold-up problem at the end since the
cost of sampling becomes sunk once it takes place. For instance, when 1
4
+ c
2
 v < 1
2
  c,
all viewers sample at least one of the two upcoming programs and some will have a
negative ex-post net utility (which can be as low as  2c). Thus, a regime with no tune-in
does not only help a TV station save on the opportunity costs tune-ins involve but does it
also increase the aggregate audience size, a win-win situation.12 However, use of tune-ins
will typically change this situation since TV stations will compete for viewers to deter
them from switching away.
11When v  12   c, just replace v + c with 12 for all cases in Table 3b except for (y; z) = (0; 0), (1; 1).
12Note that ex-ante commitment to a no tune-in policy would be optimal in such a case.
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2.2 Common private information
I now turn to the analysis of equilibrium tune-in provision under common private infor-
mation when TV stations can use tune-ins to promote their upcoming programs. A key
feature of the analysis is that a TV stations equilibrium tune-in behavior may indirectly
reveal information about its rivals upcoming program. In deriving equilibria below, I
mainly focus on 1
4
+ c
2
 v < 1
2
  c. The case v  1
2
  c is similar and I present the results
for these two cases together in Proposition 1. When v < 1
4
+ c
2
, some viewers switch o¤
right away in the absence of a tune-in. In this case, tune-ins expand viewership by creat-
ing new demand. I present the main result for this case in Proposition 2. Full derivation
of all SPBE and further details are relegated into an Online Appendix.
A no tune-in SPBE exists only if neither station has any incentive to air a tune-
in. For 1
4
+ c
2
 v < 1
2
  c, the audience share of each station in a no tune-in SPBE
will be as in Table 3b. Suppose that station Y deviates by airing a tune-in for y = 0
(the analysis is symmetric for y = 1
2
). This is an o¤-equilibrium action, so one needs to
specify o¤-equilibrium beliefs. I will here focus on passive o¤-equilibrium beliefs whereby
viewersprior beliefs about the competing program remain unchanged in response to an
unanticipated tune-in.13 Hence, after seeing an unexpected tune-in for y = 0, the rst-
period viewers of Y will continue to believe that z is equally likely to be 0, 1
2
or 1. Take
a viewer with 1
4
<   1
2
. Having seen a tune-in for y = 0, this viewer may consider
checking out station Z in the hope of nding z = 1
2
. If it turns out that z = 0, she would
stay at Z as this would give her a utility of v    (compared to v     c if she switches
back to Y , or  c if she switches o¤). If z = 1, on the other hand, switching back to Y
gives her a utility of v    c, whereas switching o¤ yields  c, so she would switch back
to Y if   v. Thus, having seen a tune-in for y = 0, switching to Z yields a higher
expected utility than staying with Y if
1
3
(v   ) + 1
3

v   1
2
+ 

+
1
3
(v     c) > v   ,
which is true if and only if  > 1
4
+ c
2
. When z = 0 or 1
2
, viewers with   1
4
+ c
2
stay
13As mentioned before, the concept of SPBE imposes no restrictions on o¤-equilibrium beliefs other
than requiring that they are identical across viewers. In particular, o¤-equilibrium beliefs following a
deviation could also be non-passive, thereby revealing information about the rival stations program. I
present other SPBE under non-passive beliefs below, and provide full derivations in the Online Appendix.
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with Y while  2 (1
4
+ c
2
; 1
2
] switch to Z, meaning that station Y generates an audience
size of 1
4
+ c
2
by unexpectedly airing a tune-in for y = 0. If it did not air a tune-in, its
audience size would be v+c
2
when z = 0 and 1
4
when z = 1
2
, as given in Table 3b. Given
that v+c
2
< 1
4
, deviation is protable in both cases if
ApN

1
4
+
c
2

  1
4

> pN
1
2
,
where the left-hand side is the expected increase in the second-period total advertising
revenue with a tune-in, and the right-hand side is the (opportunity) cost of the tune-in.
After simplifying, this condition reduces to A > 1
c
.
The analysis is very similar for v  1
2
 c. For instance, when (y; z) = (0; 0), a random
half of  2 [0; v + c] watch Y in the second period (note that this set also includes viewers
who switch from station Z). However, what matters for station Y is the fraction of its
own rst-period viewers who continue watching Y . While only a random half of this
group will do so in the absence of a tune-in, all   1
4
+ c
2
will watch if Y instead
airs a tune-in. Hence, when v  1
2
  c, deviation is protable if  1
4
+ c
2
   1
4
> 1
2A
, or
equivalently if A > 1
c
. In order to focus more on the informational e¤ects of tune-ins
and to minimize the role of exogenous costs in non-disclosure, I will henceforth assume
that A > 1
c
. This is also in line with the majority of the veriable quality disclosure
literature. With this assumption, the above unilateral deviations are always protable
and therefore a no tune-in SPBE does not exist.
(Large A assumption) A > 1
c
.14
A feature that is common to all SPBE is that qY (1; z) = 0 for all z, and qZ (y; 0) = 0
for all y; i.e., regardless of the rivals upcoming program, neither station will air a tune-
in for the program that o¤ers the poorest match for its own rst-period audience. This
is immediate since a TV station could only gain (and not lose) by concealing the least
favorable information (see Lemma 1 in the Online Appendix). However, this does not
mean that a stations upcoming program is never fully revealed to its own rst-period
14The large A assumption would be readily satised if the TV stations had a high number of non-
program minutes, or if they could use crawls,which are scrolling texts at the bottom of the TV screen.
In the latter case, the opportunity cost of a tune-in would be zero, and as such, the large A assumption
would be satised for any c > 0.
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audience. In fact, there is a fully self-revealing SPBE in which station Y airs a tune-in
as long as y 6= 1 and Z airs a tune-in as long as z 6= 0. These strategies do not depend
on the rivals program, and therefore, viewerspriors for the other stations upcoming
program remain unchanged.
To see the working of this SPBE, suppose y = 0 and station Y airs a tune-in. The
viewers of Y will continue to think that z is equally likely to be 0, 1
2
or 1, and so, as
derived earlier, those with   1
4
+ c
2
will switch to Z. If Y instead does not air a tune-in,
then its viewers will infer that y = 1. As a result, all will switch to Z. Since the worst
they can encounter in Z is z = 1, none of them will ever switch back to Y . In this sense,
punishment for not airing a tune-in is very large. By airing a tune-in, station Y can
ensure that   1
4
+ c
2
stay tuned. Since 1
4
+ c
2
> 1
2A
by the large A assumption, station
Y will never deviate from airing a tune-in for y = 0 (and similarly for y = 1
2
). Therefore
this fully self-revealing SPBE always exists. Table 4 presents the audience shares in this
SPBE for 1
4
+ c
2
 v < 1
2
  c.
z = 0 z = 1
2
z = 1
y = 0 1
4
+ c
2
; v   1
4
+ c
2
1
4
+ c
2
; v + 1
4
  c
2
v; v
y = 1
2
v + 1
4
+ 3c
2
; 1
4
  c
2
v + c; v + c v + 1
4
  c
2
; 1
4
+ c
2
y = 1 v + c; v + c 1
4
  c
2
; v + 1
4
+ 3c
2
v   1
4
+ c
2
; 1
4
+ c
2
Table 4. Audience shares of Y and Z in the fully self-revealing SPBE
when 1
4
+ c
2
 v < 1
2
  c.
Under passive beliefs, there is only one other SPBE. In this SPBE, each station airs
a tune-in unless its own or its rivals upcoming program is a poor match for its current
audience. In other words, by airing a tune-in, a station signals that the rivals program is
similar. By the same token, not airing a tune-in is not fully penalized anymore; viewers
understand that it could be so because the rival stations program is not a good match.
I will henceforth call this SPBE as the cross-signaling SPBE. In Proposition 1 below,
I summarize all equilibria for v  1
4
+ c
2
.
Proposition 1 When v  1
4
+ c
2
,
(1) There is a fully self-revealing SPBE in which qY (y; z) = 1 as long as y 6= 1, and
qZ (y; z) = 1 as long as z 6= 0. This SPBE always exists.
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(2) There is a cross-signaling SPBE in which qY (y; z) = 1 as long as y 6= 1 or
z 6= 1, and qZ (y; z) = 1 as long as y 6= 0 or z 6= 0. This SPBE exists if only if
1
4
+ c  v < 1
2
  c  1
A
.
(3) There are no other SPBE under passive beliefs.
Part (1) of the proposition follows directly from the observations above. Moreover,
I show in the Online Appendix (Lemmas 2-3) that the fully self-revealing SPBE is the
only SPBE, for any belief structure, in which qY (y; 1) = 1 for some y and qZ (0; z) = 1
for some z (e.g., station Y airs a tune-in for y = 0 even when z = 1). Otherwise, in all
other SPBE, qY (y; 1) = 0 for all y and qY (1; z) = 0 for all z (and symmetric for station
Z). The cross-signaling SPBE is one of these SPBE and I articulate more on it in the
next few paragraphs. For a more detailed proof of part (2) of Proposition 1, please see
Lemmas 4-6 in the Online Appendix. For part (3) of the proposition, please refer to
Lemmas 4-5 and 7-8 in the Online Appendix.
In the cross-signaling SPBE, tune-ins induce di¤erent inferences about the rival sta-
tions program than the fully self-revealing SPBE. If, for instance, station Y airs a tune-in
for y = 0, its viewers will infer that z equals 0 or 1
2
. As a result, viewers with   1
4
(rather than   1
4
+ c
2
as in the fully self-revealing SPBE) will stay with Y and the rest
will switch to Z. Similarly, if Y airs a tune-in for y = 1
2
, viewers with   1
4
will stay
with Y and  < 1
4
will switch to Z. Inferences in a cross-signaling SPBE are also less
pessimistic in the absence of a tune-in. If, for instance, Y does not air a tune-in, then it
could be that either y = 1 or z = 1 (or both). Given symmetry, viewers will be indi¤erent
as to which station to sample rst. Suppose a viewer samples Y rst. If y = 0, then
she will infer that z = 1, so there is no need to sample Z. But when y = 1, she can say
nothing about z. Provided that v  1
4
+ c
2
, she samples station Z, too.15 Arguing along
similar lines, one can reach the audience shares in Table 4.
As described in Proposition 1, the cross-signaling SPBE can be sustained only if
v < 1
2
  c   1
A
. When v + c is large, each station has a protable deviation by not
airing a tune-in when they are expected to air one. For instance, when (y; z) = (0; 0),
station Y can achieve an audience share of min

v+c
2
; 1
4
	
in the absence of a tune-in. Its
15This is so because second sampling is optimal if 13 (v   c  ) + 23 ( 2c)   c, or equivalently if
v     2c. Evaluated at  = 12   v   c, this implies v  14 + c2 .
16
on-equilibrium audience size is 1
4
as given in Table 5. Hence, deviation is protable if
1
4
 minv+c
2
; 1
4
	  1
2A
, or if v + c  1
2
  1
A
.
z = 0 z = 1
2
z = 1
y = 0 1
4
; v + c  1
4
1
4
; v + c+ 1
4
v + c; v + c
y = 1
2
v + c+ 1
4
; 1
4
v + c; v + c v + c+ 1
4
; 1
4
y = 1 v + c; v + c 1
4
; v + c+ 1
4
v + c  1
4
; 1
4
Table 5. Audience shares of Y and Z in the cross-signaling SPBE
when 1
4
+ c  v < 1
2
  c  1
A
.
An important feature of the cross-signaling SPBE is that the aggregate audience share
is the same as in a no tune-in regime. In contrast to the fully self-revealing SPBE, now
neither station airs a tune-in for a program that is unanimously more superior for its
rst-period viewers than its rivals upcoming program. When, for instance, station Y
airs a tune-in for y = 0, it is understood that z is either 0 or 1
2
. If it turns out that z = 0,
those who have switched to Z and have locations v <   v + c will stay tuned rather
than switch o¤ despite a negative net nal utility. Thus, in the cross-signaling SPBE,
stations only lose on the forgone revenue they could have earned from commercials, but
otherwise maintain the same ex-ante expected audience share as in a no tune-in regime.
When v  1
2
  c, unlike the other two cases, o¤-equilibrium beliefs make a di¤erence.
In particular, three other SPBE exist under the following non-passive o¤-equilibrium
beliefs: if station Y deviates and airs a tune-in, then it must be that z = 0 or 1
2
(symmetric
for station Z). These are a no tune-in SPBE, and two other symmetric SPBE: one in
which qY (y; z) = 1 only when (y; z) 2

(0; 0) ;
 
0; 1
2
	
(and qZ (y; z) = 1 only when
(y; z) 2  1
2
; 1

; (1; 1)
	
), and a second one in which qY (y; z) = 1 only when (y; z) 2 
1
2
; 0

;
 
1
2
; 1
2
	
(and qZ (y; z) = 1 only when (y; z) 2
 
1
2
; 1
2

;
 
1; 1
2
	
). Importantly, the
latter two SPBE are cross-signaling both on and o¤ the equilibrium path. That is, they
do reveal information about the competing stations upcoming program. The no tune-in
SPBE, on the other hand, is not cross-signaling on the equilibrium path, but is supported
by o¤-equilibrium beliefs that are cross-signaling: if, say, station Y deviates by airing a
tune-in for y = 0 (or for y = 1
2
), then viewers believe that z is either 0 or 1
2
. And these
beliefs are exactly what preclude TV stations from deviating. See Lemmas 7 and 8 in
the Online Appendix for further details.
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Small v and new demand creation
When v is small, viewers become more hesitant to engage in program sampling. As
a result, in the absence of a tune-in, a substantial fraction of viewers switch o¤ right
away. This has two important implications. First, tune-ins now increase the audience
size mainly by creating new demand (i.e., persuading viewers not to switch o¤). Second,
fewer viewers engage in sampling and therefore the hold-up problem is less severe. These
two implications together make airing a tune-in more valuable for each TV station.
Proposition 2 When v < 1
4
+ c
2
, the fully self-revealing SPBE is the unique SPBE.
The fully self-revealing SPBE exists for small v for the same reasons as before: if a
station fails to air a tune-in, all of its viewers switch o¤ and never come back. Station Y ,
for instance, generates an audience share of v on the equilibrium path by airing a tune-in
for y = 0. If it doesnt air a tune-in, on the other hand, its audience share will be 0.
Since v > 1
2A
(which is true given that v > 2c), a deviation is never protable (similar
for y = 1
2
). Table 6 presents the audience shares for this case.
z = 0 z = 1
2
z = 1
y = 0 v; 0 v; 2v   2c v; v
y = 1
2
2v   2c; v   2c v; v 2v   2c; v
y = 1 v   2c; v   2c v   2c; 2v   2c 0; v
Table 6. Audience shares of Y and Z in the fully self-revealing SPBE
when v < 1
4
+ c
2
.
As mentioned in the previous subsection, in a no tune-in regime, a non-empty set of
initial Y -viewers  2  v   2c; 1
2
  v + 2c switch o¤ right away after the rst program.
When (y; z) = (0; 0), on the equilibrium path, station Y gets an audience size of v
2
  c
as given in Table 3a. If Y instead (unexpectedly) airs a tune-in for y = 0, all   v
would watch Y (and only  2 1
2
  v + 2c; 1
2

would switch to Z). Here, the tune-in
persuades the viewers   v   2c to stay with Y rather than sample Z, and viewers
 2 (v  2c; v] to stay tuned rather than switch o¤. Deviation is clearly protable by the
large A assumption: v    v
2
  c > 1
2A
.
Similarly, the other SPBE cannot be maintained for small v. In the cross-signaling
SPBE, a sizable fraction of viewers switch o¤ in the absence of a tune-in, and deviation
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becomes protable because of the new demand creation motive. For instance, if station
Y does not air a tune-in, then the viewers  2  v   3c; 1
2
  v + 3c turn their TVs o¤
immediately (see Lemma 6 in the Online Appendix). This means that station Y can
increase its audience share by 3c by unexpectedly airing a tune-in for y = 0, say, when
(y; z) = (0; 1), which makes deviation protable. The SPBE that are supported by non-
passive o¤-equilibrium beliefs also require v to be large (the no tune-in SPBE requires
v  1
2
  c  1
A
and the remaining two SPBE require v  1
4
+ 3c
4
  1
4A
; see Lemmas 7 and 8
in the Online Appendix for details). As a result, when v < 1
4
+ c
2
, the fully self-revealing
SPBE arises as the unique SPBE.
3 Social Value of Tune-ins
In this section, I analyze the social value of tune-ins and consider the e¤ects of a possible
ban on their use. I assume 1
4
+ c  v < 1
2
  c   1
A
for all computations, and comment
on high v and low v cases at the end of the section. As described in Section 2, there
are two SPBE that coexist: the fully self-revealing SPBE and the cross-signaling SPBE.
I calculate the ex-ante expected social welfare under these two SPBE as well as a no
tune-in regime, and then make a comparison. In particular, I consider when a ban on
tune-ins may improve the ex-ante expected social welfare from a planners point of view.
A TV stations ex-ante expected per-viewer revenue is given by the average revenue
it would earn in the nine possible (y; z) pairs. In a regime of no tune-ins, station Y , for
instance, generates a per-viewer revenue of Ap
2
in the rst period. Per-viewer revenue in
the second period is the average of the audience shares given in Table 3b, multiplied with
pA. Given that stations Y and Z are ex-ante identical, the ex-ante expected per-viewer
revenue of each station can be expressed as
E[NTY ] = E[
NT
Z ] =

A
2
+
(6v + 6c+ 1)A
9

p,
where the superscriptNT stands for no tune-in.In the fully self-revealing SPBE, station
Y airs a tune-in in six of the nine (y; z) pairs. Thus, the per-viewer revenue it generates
in the rst period is
 
6
9
(A  1) + 3
9
A

p
2
=
 
A
2
  1
3

p. Per-viewer revenue in the second
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period is the average of the audience shares given in Table 4, multiplied with pA. Hence,
E[SRj ] =

A
2
+
(6v + 4c+ 1)A
9
  1
3

p,
where the superscript SR stands for self-revealing, and j = Y , Z. Similarly, in the
cross-signaling SPBE, station Y is expected to air a tune-in in four of the nine possible
(y; z) pairs. Given the audience shares in Table 5, it then follows that
E[CSj ] =

A
2
+
(6v + 6c+ 1)A
9
  2
9

p,
where the superscript CS stands for cross-signaling.Taking di¤erences, we reach
E[NTj   SRj ] = (2c+ 3)
p
9
, (1)
E[NTj   CSj ] =
2p
9
. (2)
Simple comparison yields that E[NTj  SRj ] > E[NTj  CSj ] > 0. Hence, expected
revenues are highest in a regime of no tune-ins and lowest in the fully self-revealing SPBE.
As described earlier, the expected second-period audience size in a regime of no tune-ins is
the same as in the cross-signaling SPBE. However, in a regime of no tune-ins, TV stations
generate higher revenues in the rst period. As for the cross-signaling SPBE versus the
fully self-revealing SPBE, the former is less costly than the latter because it involves
fewer tune-ins. Moreover, the cross-signaling SPBE is associated with a higher expected
audience size in the second period since viewers will have less precise information about
the upcoming programs in the cross-signaling SPBE and therefore will engage in more
program sampling (and given that the cost of sampling becomes sunk once it happens, a
higher fraction of those who do sampling will stay tuned).
In the Appendix, I describe how to calculate the ex-ante expected utility of a random
viewer in regime i (i = NT , SR, CS), denoted by E[U i]. As provided at the end of the
Appendix, the resulting expected utility di¤erences are given by
E

USR   UNT  = 1
9
(7  4v   10c) c, (3)
E

UCS   UNT  = 1
3
  c

c. (4)
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Given that 1
4
+ c  v < 1
2
  c   1
A
, both of the terms above are strictly positive. It is
also straightforward to verify that E

USR   UNT  > E UCS   UNT . Hence, perhaps
not surprisingly, expected viewer utility is highest in the equilibrium conguration with
the highest number of tune-ins, and lowest in the one with no tune-ins.
Let W i denote the expected social welfare in regime i (i = NT , SR, CS). I use the
conventional approach and let W i equal the ex-ante expected total revenue of the two
stations plus the ex-ante expected aggregate viewer utility. Given the expected revenue
di¤erence in (1) and the expected viewer utility di¤erence in (3), the di¤erence in the
expected social welfare between SR and NT regimes can be expressed as
W SR  WNT = N E USR   UNT   2E[NTj   SRj ]
= N

1
9
(7  4v   10c) c 

2
3
+
4cA
9

p

. (5)
Even though viewers are unambiguously better o¤in the fully self-revealing SPBE, the
average amount of revenue stations lose could be very high (the second term in the above
brackets). This is due not only to the opportunity costs stations incur by airing tune-
ins, but also to the reduced aggregate audience size since viewers make better-informed
decisions with better information. Ceteris paribus, W SR  WNT will tend to be positive
as p approaches 0, and negative as c approaches 0, or as A grows su¢ ciently large. In
the former case (p ! 0), the revenue earned from commercials is too little compared to
viewer well-being, so W SR  WNT has the same sign as E USR   UNT . Since viewers
make better-informed decisions and incur lower sampling costs in the fully self-revealing
SPBE, E

USR   UNT  > 0 and hence W SR > WNT . When c approaches 0, the change
in viewer well-being across the two regimes will be negligible, and hence nowW SR WNT
will have the same sign as E[SRj  NTj ]. Because of the lose-lose situation stations face
in the fully self-revealing SPBE (air more tune-ins and get fewer viewers on average),
E[SRj  NTj ] < 0 for any positive p, so W SR < WNT in this case. When A grows large,
on the other hand, although the cost of a tune-in becomes negligible, the reduction in
the audience size under the SR regime (because of better-informed viewing decisions)
will imply a large revenue loss in the second period compared to a no tune-in regime.
Therefore, once again, the aggregate welfare under the NT regime will be higher.
The curve indicated by W SR = WNT in Figure 1 is, for a given v and A, the locus of
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(c; p) for which (5) equals zero. In other words, it is given by the equation
p =
(7  4v   10c) c
6 + 4cA
.
For all (c; p) values that are under this locus, W SR > WNT . Similarly, for all values
above, W SR < WNT . As A increases, this locus shifts downwards and as a result the
region where the SR regime dominates shrinks.
[FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
For the cross-signaling SPBE, using expressions (2) and (4), the di¤erence in the
expected social welfare between CS and NT regimes can similarly be expressed as
WCS  WNT = N E UCS   UNT   2E[NTj   CSj ]
= N

1
3
  c

c  4p
9

. (6)
Once again, for the same reasons as above, WCS  WNT will tend to be positive as
p ! 0, and negative as c ! 0 (recall that c < 1
8
, so 1
3
  c > 0). Now, however, it will
not depend on how small or large A is, because the expected aggregate audience size
is the same in the cross-signaling SPBE as in a no tune-in regime. Thus, the sign of
WCS  WNT will be solely determined by how viewer well-being improves relative to the
cost of tune-ins. The bell-shaped curve labeled by WCS = WNT in Figure 1 indicates
the locus of (c; p) values for which the expression in (6) equals zero; i.e.,
p =
9
4

1
3
  c

c.
For all (c; p) values under this locus,WCS > WNT , and for all values above,WCS < WNT .
Investigating Figure 1 carefully, one can see that the cross-signaling SPBE produces
the highest expected welfare when (c; p) values fall under the WCS = WNT locus and
above the W SR = WCS locus. Similarly, the intersection of the areas under the W SR =
WNT locus and the W SR = WCS locus is where W SR is the highest. In all other regions,
the no tune-in regime produces the highest expected welfare.
Proposition 3 A ban on the use of tune-ins improves the ex-ante expected social welfare
if and only if
p  max

(7  4v   10c) c
6 + 4cA
;
9
4

1
3
  c

c

.
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In summary, if the sampling cost is relatively low or the price of a commercial is
relatively high, then a regime without any tune-ins generates the highest welfare. Other-
wise, a regime that provides just enoughinformation to viewers will be welfare superior.
Thus, it may be welfare improving if the two stations were commonly owned by the same
media company that maximized total ad revenues. In such a case, as long as v is relatively
large, a no tune-in SPBE exists.
Tune-ins clearly benet viewers. Without tune-ins, viewers engage in too much in-
e¢ cient program sampling and some end up watching TV despite a negative utility. In
the fully self-revealing SPBE, TV stations are forced to air too many tune-ins and this
implies a large opportunity cost. Moreover, the higher the number of tune-ins, the more
informed choices viewers make, implying a smaller audience size in the second period.
As a result, the stations are double jeopardized compared to a no tune-in regime. The
former one of these two factors is also present in the cross-signaling SPBE; stations lose
on the forgone revenue they could have earned from commercials. However, the expected
aggregate audience size in the cross-signaling SPBE is the same as in a no tune-in regime.
This is the main reason why the cross-signaling SPBE may produce the highest expected
welfare even if a no tune-in regime welfare-dominates the fully self-revealing SPBE.
When v is large, the hold-up problem becomes less severe and fewer viewers regret
their initial choices. This makes the fully-revealing SPBE less penalizing. As a result, the
fully-revealing SPBE will have a relatively larger set of parameters where it is socially
the best. However, the main trade-o¤ remains the same: if p is relatively high, then
advertising revenues become more important and a regime with no tune-ins will raise
the highest ex-ante welfare. Similarly, if c is relatively high, then the most informative
regime will be the best one. On the other hand, when v is small, tune-ins create new
demand thereby expanding the set of viewers who watch TV. In this case, not only the
viewers but also the TV stations benet from tune-ins. As a result, the fully-revealing
SPBE will yield the highest ex-ante welfare even when p is relatively high. In other
words, the fully-revealing SPBE is not only the unique market outcome when v is small,
but also the socially optimal outcome.
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4 Conclusion
This paper has presented a theoretical analysis of tune-ins by competing broadcasters in
a horizontally di¤erentiated duopoly TV market. Tune-ins are purely informative signals
that inform viewers about the horizontal attributes of a program. They generally serve
two purposes: create new demand and steal business from the rival station. An important
element of the model is the common private information assumption; while the viewers
are uncertain about program attributes, each TV station is perfectly informed about its
own as well as its rivals program. As a result, the tune-in decision of a station may
reveal indirect information about the rival stations program.
The main ndings can be summarized as follows. The business-stealing motive alone
is generally su¢ cient to induce TV stations to air a tune-in for their upcoming programs,
despite the opportunity cost in terms of lost advertising revenue. In equilibrium, tune-ins
are not necessarily informative of the rival stations program. When they are, however,
the resulting aggregate welfare is generally higher compared to when tune-in decisions
are made independently. Finally, when the sampling cost is relatively small or the price
of a commercial is relatively high, a ban on tune-ins improves welfare by increasing TV
stationsadvertising revenues, though it is harmful for viewers.
As described in the Introduction, the TV market has highly idiosyncratic features. In
order to capture these features, I have made simplifying assumptions. For instance, the
particular way I have modeled viewerssampling behavior relies on a central opportunity
cost interpretation, causing a change in the relative utility of the current choice versus the
other options. Moreover, I assume that sampling each program takes the same amount
of time and costs the same for all viewers. An extension may focus on a more general
sampling/switching process that relaxes these (and possibly other) restrictions.
I have not allowed any switching costs in the analysis. In general, one can distinguish
between sampling and switching costs. A small but positive switching cost creates state
dependence whereby viewers stay with their initial choices when they expect the same
utility in both stations. This gives each station more market power, thereby lowering
their incentives to air tune-ins. As a result, business-stealing motive alone may no longer
be enough to induce tune-ins in equilibrium.
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Appendix: Expected utility calculation
To nd the expected viewer utility, one needs to calculate the expected utility of a random
viewer in all of the nine possible program combinations, and then take the average of
those. This is a tedious but otherwise straightforward task. For brevity, I nd below the
expected utility of a random viewer only for (y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

under three specications;
the fully self-revealing SPBE (SR), the cross-signaling SPBE (CS), and the no tune-in
SPBE (NT). Derivations are made under the assumption that 1
4
+ c  v < 1
2
  c. It is
straightforward to repeat the same analysis for the other (y; z) pairs (note that one only
needs to analyze ve more cases, because the remaining three cases are symmetric). At
the end, I present the results for the other cases and calculate the resulting expected
viewer utility.
In the SR regime, both stations air a tune-in when (y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

. Among those who
watched Y in the rst period,   1
4
+ c
2
stay with Y after seeing a tune-in for y = 0
while the others switch to Z and stay there. Behavior of the viewers who watched Z
in the rst period is similar. Those with  > 3
4
+ c
2
initially switch to Y in the hope of
nding out y = 1. After discovering that y = 0, 3
4
+ c
2
<   1
2
+ v come back to Z while
the others turn their TVs o¤. So,
USR =
8>><>>:
v    , 0    1
4
+ c
2
v   1
2
   , 1
4
+ c
2
<   3
4
+ c
2
v   c  + 1
2
, 3
4
+ c
2
<   1
2
+ v
 c , 1
2
+ v <   1
.
In the CS regime, station Y does, Z does not air a tune-in when (y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

.
Among those who watched Y in the rst period,   1
4
stay with Y while the others
switch to Z and stay there. Among those who watched Z in the rst period, a random
half stay with Z. After seeing that z = 1
2
, they infer that y = 0, so 1
2
   1
2
+v+c stay
and the others switch o¤. The other half start sampling with Y . After seeing that y = 0,
they infer z 2 0; 1
2
; 1
	
, so all switch to Z. Those with 1
2
   1
2
+ v+ c eventually stay,
the others switch o¤. So,
UCS =
8>><>>:
v    , 0    1
4
v   (1
2
  ) , 1
4
<   1
2
1
2
(v   + 1
2
) + 1
2
(v   c  + 1
2
) , 1
2
<   1
2
+ v + c
1
2
( c) + 1
2
( 2c) , 1
2
+ v + c <   1
.
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Finally, in the NT regime, a random half of viewers start with Y and the other half
start with Z. Viewers with locations 1
4
  3c
2
   1
4
+ 3c
2
settle in the rst station they
sample, thus incurring no sampling cost, while the others will continue sampling. For
  1
4
  3c
2
, if the viewer is has started with Y , she stays there. If she started with Z, then
she also samples Y . Similarly, 1
4
+ 3c
2
   3
4
+ 3c
2
end up at Z either immediately or after
initially sampling Y . All others sample both stations and those with 3
4
+ 3c
2
   1
2
+v+c
stay tuned. Hence,
UNT =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
2
(v   ) + 1
2
(v   c  ) , 0   < 1
4
  3c
2
1
2
(v   ) + 1
2
(v   1
2
+ ) , 1
4
  3c
2
   1
4
+ 3c
2
1
2
(v   1
2
  ) + 1
2
(v   c  1
2
  ) , 1
4
+ 3c
2
<   3
4
+ 3c
2
v   c  (  1
2
) , 3
4
+ 3c
2
<   1
2
+ v + c
 2c , 1
2
+ v + c <   1
.
Taking the di¤erences, we can express E

USR   UNT  as:
E

USR   UNT  =
1
4
  3c
2Z
0
c
2
d+
1
4
+ c
2Z
1
4
  3c
2

1
4
  

d+
1
4
+ 3c
2Z
1
4
+ c
2

  1
4

d+
3
4
+ c
2Z
1
4
+ 3c
2
c
2
d
+
3
4
+ 3c
2Z
3
4
+ c
2

  c
2

d+
1
2
+v+cZ
1
2
+v

  1
2
  v

d+
1Z
1
2
+v+c
cd.
After simple algebra, this expression becomes
E

USR   UNT j (y; z) =

0;
1
2

=

7
8
  c
4
  v

c.
Similarly, E

UCS   UNT  can be expressed as:
E

UCS   UNT  =
1
4
  3c
2Z
0
c
2
d+
1
4Z
1
4
  3c
2

1
4
  

d+
1
4
+ 3c
2Z
1
4

  1
4

d+
1
2Z
1
4
+ 3c
2
c
2
d+
1Z
3
4
+ 3c
2
c
2
d,
which leads to
E

UCS   UNT j (y; z) =

0;
1
2

=
3c
8
.
The case (y; z) =
 
1
2
; 1

is perfectly symmetric with (y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

, and therefore gen-
erates the same expected viewer utility. By this reasoning, we need to nd the expected
utility only for ve of the remaining eight cases. The calculations follow exactly the same
steps as above. For convenience, I report the results here:
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 (y; z) = (0; 0) (symmetric with (y; z) = (1; 1)):
E

USR   UNT j (y; z) = (0; 0) = 3
4
  3c
2

c,
E

UCS   UNT j (y; z) = (0; 0) = 1
4
  3c
2

c.
 (y; z) = (1
2
; 0) (symmetric with (y; z) =
 
1; 1
2

):
E

USR   UNT j (y; z) =

1
2
; 0

=

5
8
  c
4

c,
E

UCS   UNT j (y; z) =

1
2
; 0

=
3c
8
.
 (y; z) = (0; 1) :
E

USR   UNT j (y; z) = (0; 1) = 5
4
  3c
2
  2v

c,
E

UCS   UNT j (y; z) = (0; 1) = 1
4
  3c
2

c.
 (y; z) = (1; 0) :
E

USR   UNT j (y; z) = (1; 0) = 3
4
  3c
2

c,
E

UCS   UNT j (y; z) = (1; 0) = 1
4
  3c
2

c.
 (y; z) = (1
2
; 1
2
) :
E

USR   UNT j (y; z) =

1
2
;
1
2

=

1
2
  3c

c,
E

UCS   UNT j (y; z) =

1
2
;
1
2

=

1
2
  3c

c.
Finally, taking the average over all nine possible (y; z) cases, we reach equations (3) and
(4), which are used in welfare calculations in section 3:
E

USR   UNT  = 1
9
(7  4v   10c) c,
E

UCS   UNT  = 1
3
  c

c.
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Online Appendix: Full analysis of all SPBE
I here characterize all symmetric SPBE of the game presented in the main text. I do so
by presenting a series of lemmas. All results are presented for station Y only (everything
is symmetric for Z). Station Y can only inuence the viewing decisions of its own rst-
period audience by airing a tune-in (or not airing), and this is all that matters for station
Y to deviate or not. Below, unless stated otherwise, I focus on station Y s rst-period
audience only for all calculations.
Lemma 1 In every SPBE, qY (1; z) = 0 for all z.
Proof: This is straightforward. A station would never reveal its worst program by
dedicating a costly tune-in to it. Assume on the contrary that there is an SPBE in
which qY (1; z) = 1 for some z. If, after seeing a tune-in for y = 1, Y -viewers assign
any positive probability on the equilibrium path to z = 0 or z = 1
2
, then all will switch
away from Y (some will switch o¤ right away if v is small) and never come back even
if it turns that z = 1. It is thus protable to deviate and not air a tune-in for y = 1,
thereby saving on the cost of the tune-in. The remaining possibility (that viewers assign
a positive probability only to z = 1 after seeing a tune-in) cannot arise, because, given
that it is optimal to air a tune-in when (y; z) = (1; 1), it must be then protable for Y
to deviate and air a tune-in for y = 1 when z = 0 or z = 1
2
, so as to mislead viewers to
think that z = 1. Thus, it must be that qY (1; z) = 0 for all z. Note that this proof does
not make any use of passive beliefs, so it holds for all belief structures. Also note this
result does not mean that viewers wont fully infer y = 1 in equilibrium. It may be the
case that in equilibrium station Y airs a tune-in whenever y = 0 or 1
2
, so not seeing a
tune-in would then mean that y = 1.
Remark 1: Lemma 1 implies that there are no SPBE in which station Y airs a tune-in
for all (y; z). This means that qY = 0 is never an o¤-equilibrium message by station Y .
However, viewers may still nd out an o¤-equilibrium situation at the interim-stage.
Lemma 2 If qY (0; 1) = 1 in some SPBE, then qY
 
1
2
; 1

= 1 in the same SPBE (and
vice versa).
1
Proof: Take a candidate SPBE in which qY (0; 1) = 1, but qY
 
1
2
; 1

= 0. In the event
Y does not air a tune-in, regardless of what qY (0; 0), qY
 
0; 1
2

, qY
 
1
2
; 0

and qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

are in equilibrium, Y -viewersbeliefs are going to be more inclined towards station Z.
To see this, suppose qY (0; 0) = qY
 
0; 1
2

= qY
 
1
2
; 0

= qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

= 1. This means that,
conditional on qY = 0, equilibrium inferences are (y; z) 2

(1; 0) ;
 
1; 1
2

; (1; 1) ;
 
1
2
; 1
	
.
With these inferences, since it is much more likely that y = 1 than z = 1, no rst-period
Y -viewer will continue to stay with Y . Having qY (0; 0) and/or qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

= 0 does not
change anything since these are symmetric changes for both stations. The best scenario
for station Y is when qY
 
1
2
; 0

= 0. In this case, inferences will be such that pr
 
y = 1
2

=
2
5
and pr(y = 1) = 3
5
for station Y , while pr
 
z = 1
2

= 1
5
and pr(z = 0) = pr(z = 1) = 1
5
for Z. It can be again easily veried that, even in this best scenario, all Y -viewers will
switch away from Y after seeing qY = 0. Some or all of these viewers will switch to
station Z (and some will switch o¤ right away if v is small). When they nd out that
z = 1, their interim beliefs will be y 2 1
2
; 1
	
. First suppose v c < 1
2
. Switching back to
Y is optimal for those  for whom 1
2
 
v   c   1
2
  + 1
2
max f 2c; v   c  (1  )g 
max f c; v   (1  )g. This is satised for   1
2
  (v   c). Hence, when (y; z) =  1
2
; 1

,
the number of viewers from the initial Y audience that end up watching Y is v c. When
v is small, this number is going to be even smaller since some viewers will have already
switched o¤. Now, suppose Y instead airs a tune-in for y = 1
2
when (y; z) =
 
1
2
; 1

. If
qY
 
1
2
; 0

= qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

= 0 on the equilibrium path, then airing a tune-in for y = 1
2
is
an o¤-equilibrium action. In this case, Y-viewers are free to believe anything about z.
Suppose some of them switch to Z based on their inferences. However, when z = 1,
those for whom v   c   1
2
     c (i.e.,  2 1
2
 minv; 1
2
	
; 1
2

) will switch back to
Y , implying an audience size of min

v; 1
2
	
from the set of initial Y -viewers. Thus, by
deviating from qY
 
1
2
; 1

= 0, station Y is able to increase its second period audience size
from v  c to minv; 1
2
	
, a net increase of min

c; 1
2
  (v   c)	. If this is greater than 1
2A
,
then station Y will deviate and air a tune-in for y = 1
2
when (y; z) =
 
1
2
; 1

. Note that
when c < 1
2
  (v   c) (i.e., when v < 1
2
), the net increase in audience will be c, which is
greater than 1
2A
by the large A assumption.
Suppose that 1
2
  (v   c)  1
2A
, so the above deviation is not protable. However,
2
then, Y will have an incentive to deviate from qY (0; 1) = 1 by not airing a tune-in. On
the equilibrium path when Y airs a tune-in, it will at best get all of its viewers to stay
tuned (this happens if viewers infer z = 1 after seeing a tune-in for y = 0). When it
deviates, on the other hand, all of its viewers will initially switch to Z. When they nd
out that z = 1, their interim beliefs will be y 2 1
2
; 1
	
and   1
2
 minv   c; 1
2
	
will
switch back to Y . Deviation is protable if 1
2
 minv   c; 1
2
	  1
2A
, which is true since
1
2
  (v   c)  1
2A
. Hence, for 1
2
< v < 1
2
+ c, station Y will deviate either by airing a
tune-in for y = 1
2
when (y; z) =
 
1
2
; 1

, or otherwise by not airing a tune-in for y = 0 when
(y; z) = (0; 1). Similarly, when v   c  1
2
, station Y will strictly benet by not airing a
tune-in for y = 0. Thus, the candidate SPBE is invalidated and as a result, Lemma 2
follows. The analysis is exactly the same for the vice versapart and is therefore skipped.
Note that this proof again does not depend on the use of passive beliefs, so it is true for
all belief structures.
Lemma 3 If qY (0; 1) = qY
 
1
2
; 1

= 1 in some SPBE, then qY (0; z) = qY
 
1
2
; z

= 1 for
all z in the same SPBE.
Proof: Take a candidate SPBE in which qY (0; 1) = qY
 
1
2
; 1

= 1, but qY (0; 0) = 0. In
the event that Y does not air a tune-in, regardless of what qY
 
0; 1
2

, qY
 
1
2
; 0

and qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

are in equilibrium, Y -viewersbeliefs are going to be more inclined towards station Z
(for the same reasons as in Lemma 2, but now even more aggravated). Therefore, they
all sample Z rst (again, this is under the assumption that v is large enough if v is
small, then some viewers will switch o¤, which at the end makes deviation even more
desirable). When z = 0, depending on the equilibrium value of qY
 
1
2
; 0

, their interim
beliefs will be either (y; z) 2 f(0; 0) ; (1; 0)g or (y; z) 2 (0; 0) ;  1
2
; 0

; (1; 0)
	
. In the rst
case, none of the initial Y -viewers return to Y , because they incur the sampling cost if
they do so even if y = 0. In the second case, viewers for whom   1
4
+ 3c
2
switch
back to Y in the hope of nding y = 1
2
(the threshold viewer is found by 2
3
(v   c  ) +
1
3
 
v   c   1
2
   = v   ) again, if v is small, a smaller fraction of these viewers
will switch back. When y = 0, two stations o¤er the same utility for these viewers, so
a random half of  2 1
4
+ 3c
2
;min

v + c; 1
2
	
stay with Y , and the remaining random
half switch back to Z. Hence, when (y; z) = (0; 0), at most 1
2
 
min

v + c; 1
2
	  1
4
  3c
2

3
viewers from the initial Y audience end up watching Y . If Y instead airs a tune-in
for y = 0 when (y; z) = (0; 0), equilibrium inferences of the audience will be either
(y; z) = (0; 1) or (y; z) 2  0; 1
2

; (0; 1)
	
. In the rst case, viewers with   minv; 1
2
	
stay tuned in Y while the rest switch o¤. In the second case, viewers with   1
4
+ c
2
stay
tuned and the rest switch to Z. When they nd out z = 0, none of those who switched
will go back to Y since both stations o¤er the same program type. As a result, at worst
1
4
+ c
2
viewers from the initial Y audience will watch Y in the second period. Hence, by
airing an unexpected tune-in, station Y is able to increase its second period audience
size by 1
4
+ c
2
  1
2
 
min

v + c; 1
2
	  1
4
  3c
2

, which equals 1
8
+ 5c
4
+ 1
2
 
1
2
 minv + c; 1
2
	
.
For large A, this is greater than 1
2A
. and so station Y would deviate and air a tune-in
for y = 0 when (y; z) = (0; 0).
To show that qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

= 1, we follow exactly the same steps and it will yield the
same result: By airing an unexpected tune-in, station Y is able to increase its second
period audience size by 1
8
+ 5c
4
+ 1
2
 
1
2
 minv + c; 1
2
	
, which is greater than 1
2A
for large
A. Hence, station Y would deviate and air a tune-in for y = 1
2
when (y; z) =
 
1
2
; 1
2

.
Now, given qY (0; 0) = qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

= qY (0; 1) = qY
 
1
2
; 1

= 1 in a particular SPBE,
it is easy to show that qY
 
0; 1
2

= qY
 
1
2
; 0

= 1. First, suppose on the contrary that
qY
 
0; 1
2

= 0. Again, all initial Y -viewers sample Z rst. When z = 1
2
, the interim beliefs
will be (y; z) 2  0; 1
2

;
 
1; 1
2
	
. Those  for whom 1
2
(v   c  )+ 1
2
 
v   c   1
2
   
v  1
2
   switch back to Y . This solves as   1
4
 c (again, if v is small, a lower subset
will switch back to Y which makes the result stronger). When they nd out that y = 0,
all of them stay with Y . Hence, when (y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

, exactly 1
4
  c viewers from the
initial Y audience end up watching Y . Now, if Y instead airs a tune-in for y = 0 when
(y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

, equilibrium inferences of the audience will be (y; z) 2 f(0; 0) ; (0; 1)g. In
this case, no Y -viewer switches to Z and the viewers with   minv; 1
2
	
stay tuned
in Y . By airing an unexpected tune-in, station Y is able to increase its second period
audience size by min

v; 1
2
	    1
4
  c, which is greater than 1
2A
. Hence, deviation is
protable. The arguments are identical for (y; z) =
 
1
2
; 0

. These observations establish
Lemma 3. The construction has not used passive beliefs at all, so Lemma 3 is true for
all belief structures.
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Remark 2: As described in the main text, the fully self-revealing SPBE always exists,
driven by the (rationally) pessimistic inferences in the absence of a tune-in. If, for in-
stance, station Y does not air a tune-in, its viewers will infer that y = 1. As a result,
all will switch to Z and none will ever switch back to Y . In other words, punishment
for not airing a tune-in is very large. Therefore, station Y will be forced to air a tune-in
when y = 0 or 1
2
. Note that these arguments do not depend on how one species o¤-
equilibrium beliefs, because o¤-equilibrium beliefs are irrelevant in the fully self-revealing
SPBE (by Lemma 1, station Y would never consider airing a tune-in for y = 1). Lem-
mas 2 and 3 above also establish that the fully self-revealing SPBE is the only SPBE in
which qY (0; 1) = qY
 
1
2
; 1

= 1.
Lemma 4 There are no SPBE in which only qY (0; 0) = 1; or only qY
 
0; 1
2

= 1; or only
qY
 
1
2
; 0

; or only qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

= 1.
Proof: Suppose there is an SPBE in which only qY (0; 0) = 1. On the equilibrium
path, when station Y airs a tune-in, viewers infer that (y; z) = (0; 0), so each station
gets an audience of 1
2
min

v; 1
2
	
. However, if Y deviates and does not air a tune-in,
since inferences will be symmetric, a random half of its viewers will initially stay with
Y while the remaining half switches to Z (if v is small, then some viewers will switch
o¤, again making the result stronger). Upon seeing y = 0, those who stayed with Y
will infer (incorrectly) that z 2 1
2
; 1
	
. Those with  > 1
4
+ c switch to Z. Once
they see that z = 0, they are indi¤erent between the two stations, so a random half
of  2 (1
4
+ c;min

v + c; 1
2
	
] switch back to Y . Everything is identical for those who
have initially switched to Z. As a result, stations Y and Z equally share the viewers
with   minv + c; 1
2
	
, yielding an audience size of 1
2
min

v + c; 1
2
	
for each from the
rst-period Y -audience. Hence, station Y receives at least as many viewers as it would
with a tune-in, which makes deviation protable. Arguments are exactly the same for
qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

= 1.
Suppose now that only qY
 
0; 1
2

= 1. Suppose Y airs a tune-in for y = 0 when
(y; z) = (0; 0). In this case, viewers will incorrectly think that z = 1
2
, so  > 1
4
will switch
to Z. Once they see z = 0, they will stay or switch o¤, but not come to Y . In case Y
does not air a tune-in, on the other hand,  < 1
4
initially switch to Z again assuming v
5
is not too small (to see this, rst note that in case of qY = 0,  = 14 will be the indi¤erent
viewer between the two stations.  < 1
4
will then switch to Z since it is more likely
that z = 0). They will all stay at Z when they nd out z = 0. Those who have stayed
with Y will initially infer that z 2 f0; 1g upon seeing y = 0, so 1
4
   minv + c; 1
2
	
will continue to stay with Y . Hence, if 1
4
   minv + c; 1
2
	  1
4

> 1
2A
, then deviation
is protable. If this inequality is not satised, then Y deviates by not airing a tune-in
for y = 0 when (y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

. Again,  < 1
4
switch to Z in such a case, and once
they see z = 1
2
, they infer y 2 1
2
; 1
	
. Therefore, none will switch back to Y . On
the other hand, station Y will get min

v + c; 1
2
	   1
4
. Hence, deviating by not airing a
tune-in for y = 0 when (y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

is optimal if 1
4
   minv + c; 1
2
	  1
4
  1
2A
. As a
result, station Y will deviate either from qY (0; 0) = 0, or otherwise from qY
 
0; 1
2

= 1.
Arguments are symmetric for qY
 
1
2
; 0

= 1. These observations establish Lemma 4.
Again, the construction has not used passive beliefs at all, so Lemma 4 holds for all
belief structures.
Lemma 5 There are no SPBE in which only qY (0; 0) = qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

= 1.
Proof: This is obvious from Lemma 4. If Y airs a tune-in for y = 0, it perfectly reveals
that z = 0, leading to an audience size of 1
2
min

v; 1
2
	
. By deviating from qY (0; 0) = 1,
it is able to raise its audience (from the initial Y -viewers) to min 1
2

v + c; 1
2
	
, for the
same reasons as described in Lemma 4. Hence, deviation is always optimal.
Remark 3: Lemmas 1-5 establish that, besides the fully self-revealing SPBE, there are
only 4 other possibilities: an SPBE with no tune-ins, an SPBE in which only qY (0; 0) =
qY
 
0; 1
2

= 1, or only qY
 
1
2
; 0

= qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

= 1, and an SPBE in which qY (y; z) = 1
when y; z = 0; 1
2
. The last one of these exists for 1
4
+c  v < 1
2
 c  1
A
as described in part
(2) of Proposition 1. The other three SPBE exist if and only if viewers hold non-passive
beliefs.
Lemma 6A cross-signaling SPBE in which qY (y; z) = 1 exists when 14+c  v < 12 c  1A
as long as (y; z) 2 (0; 0) ;  0; 1
2

;
 
1
2
; 0

;
 
1
2
; 1
2
	
.
Proof: Take Table 5 as given and assume 1
4
+ c  v < 1
2
  c. To show that there are no
protable deviations, suppose station Y deviates from qY (0; 0) = 1 by not airing a tune-
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in. Given the symmetry of the posterior beliefs, a random half of its viewers will stay with
Y while the other half will switch away. Those who stayed will think that z = 1 upon
seeing y = 0, and the ones with locations less than v+ c will continue to stay. Those who
have initially switched to Z will think that y = 1 upon seeing z = 0, and therefore none
of them will switch back to Y . Hence, station Y will get an audience share of v+c
2
. From
Table 5, we see that station Y s on-equilibrium audience size is 1
4
when (y; z) = (0; 0).
Note that all of these viewers are from station Y s rst-period audience. As a result,
deviation is unprotable if 1
4
  v+c
2
> 1
2A
, or if v + c  1
2
  1
A
. When v + c  1
2
, station
Y s deviation audience share becomes 1
4
from its own rst-period viewers, so deviation
is surely protable in this case. The same arguments apply equally to
 
0; 1
2

;
 
1
2
; 0

and 
1
2
; 1
2

. It remains to analyze if it is protable for Y to deviate when (y; z) = (0; 1) or
(1
2
; 1). In both cases, station Y is already getting v+ c from its rst-period audience, and
it cannot improve upon this by airing a tune-in. Therefore, a deviation is not protable
in these two cases, either.
As explained in the main text, v must be greater than 1
4
+ c in order to maintain this
SPBE. Otherwise, a signicant fraction of viewers switch o¤ in the absence of a tune-in.
To see this, suppose station Y does not air a tune-in. The inferences are such that Y did
not air a tune-in because either y = 1 and/or z = 1. There are ve possibilities:
(y; z) 2 f(0; 1) ; (1
2
; 1); (1; 0) ; (1;
1
2
); (1; 1)g.
These inferences are symmetric for y and z, and so viewers are indi¤erent between
the two stations. Thus, a random half will sample z rst. For those who stay with Y ,
the actual location of y will determine their further behavior. If y = 0, they infer that
z = 1, so viewers with   v+ c stay with Y and the rest switch o¤. If y = 1
2
, they infer
that z = 1, so 1
2
  v  c    1
2
stay with Y and the rest switch o¤. If y = 1, they infer
that z 2 0; 1
2
; 1
	
, each with equal probability. In this case, we know from the analysis
in subsection 2.1.(ii) that  2  v   2c; 1
2
  v + 2c will switch o¤ if v < 1
4
+ c
2
, whereas all
  1
2
will sample z if v  1
4
+ c
2
. Take v  1
4
+ c
2
. If it turns out that z = 0, all   v+ c
watch Z and v+ c <   1
2
switch o¤. Similarly, if z = 1
2
, all 1
2
  v  c    1
2
watch Z
and  < 1
2
  v   c switch o¤. If z = 1, on the other hand, all rst-period Y -viewers will
switch o¤ (after having sampled both programs). For those rst-period Y -viewers who
7
switched to Z initially, the subsequent choices are similar.
Now, we need to check if the rst sampling is desirable at all, conditional on not
seeing a tune-in. For  < 1
2
  v   c, the expected utility of sampling station Y is
E

UY j qY = 0

=
1
5
(v   ) + 1
5
( c) + 3
5

1
3
(v   c  ) + 2
3
( 2c)

.
It is easy to check that this value is non-negative when 1
5
(2v   2  6c)  0, or equiv-
alently when   v   3c. But v   3c < 1
2
  v   c when v < 1
4
+ c, so it follows that
viewers with  2  v   3c; 1
2
  v   c switch o¤ right away in the absence of a tune-in.
By monotonicity, 1
2
  (v + c)   < 1
4
will also switch o¤ in the absence of a tune-in. For
v < 1
4
+ c
2
, the result is the same since v 3c < v 2c. As a result, when v < 1
4
+c, viewers
with  2  v   3c; 1
2
  v + 3c switch o¤ right away in the absence of a tune-in. However,
station Y can ensure an audience share of v by airing a tune-in when (y; z) = (0; 1) or
(1
2
; 1). Since v  (v   3c) > 1
2A
by the large A assumption, station Y would deviate from
qY (0; 1) = 0 and qY
 
1
2
; 1

= 0 by instead airing a tune-in. This means that v must be
greater than 1
4
+ c in order to maintain the cross-signaling SPBE.
Lemma 7 A no tune-in SPBE exists for v + c+ 1
A
 1
2
when o¤-equilibrium beliefs are
non-passive.
Proof: Start from a no tune-in regime. First, when y = 1 or z = 1, station Y surely
cannot increase its audience size by airing a tune-in. Under passive beliefs, if station Y
deviates by airing a tune-in, say for (y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

,  > 1
4
+ c
2
will switch to Z. Upon
seeing z = 1
2
, those who have switched to Z will stay at Z. Thus, station Y s audience
size will be 1
4
+ c
2
. The equilibrium audience size of station Y in a no tune-in SPBE for
(y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

is 1
4
. Deviation is protable if 1
4
+ c
2
  1
4
> 1
2A
, or equivalently if c
2
> 1
2A
.
This is true under the large A assumption. Hence, under passive beliefs, a no tune-in
SPBE does not exist.
Suppose now that viewers hold non-passive o¤-equilibrium beliefs such that if Y
unexpectedly airs a tune-in for y = 0 or 1
2
, then they believe z 2 0; 1
2
	
. When station
Y deviates and airs a tune-in, say for (y; z) = (0; 0) (or for (y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

),  > 1
4
will switch to Z under these non-passive beliefs. Upon seeing z = 0 (or z = 1
2
), those
who have switched to Z will stay at Z. Thus, station Y s audience size will be 1
4
. The
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equilibrium viewership of station Y from its own rst-period audience in a no tune-in
SPBE for (y; z) = (0; 0) is min

v+c
2
; 1
4
	
(and 1
4
for (y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

). Deviation is clearly
not protable for (y; z) =
 
0; 1
2

, since Y cannot generate any additional audience. For
(y; z) = (0; 0), deviation is not protable if 1
4
  1
2
min

v + c; 1
2
	  1
2A
, or equivalently
if v + c + 1
A
 1
2
. Note that this is the same threshold as in the cross-signaling SPBE.
Analysis is symmetric for (y; z) =
 
1
2
; 0

and
 
1
2
; 1
2

. For (y; z) = (0; 1) and (y; z) =
 
1
2
; 1

,
station Y is able to get an audience of min

v + c; 1
2
	
from the initial Y -viewers in a no
tune-in SPBE, which cannot be increased by airing a tune-in. Hence, under non-passive
beliefs, a no tune-in SPBE exists when v + c+ 1
A
 1
2
.
Lemma 8 An SPBE in which only qY (0; 0) = qY
 
0; 1
2

= 1, or only qY
 
1
2
; 0

=
qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

= 1 exists for 1
4
+ 3c
4
  1
4A
 v < 1
2
  c   1
2A
when o¤-equilibrium beliefs
are non-passive.
Proof: Take an SPBE in which only qY (0; 0) = qY
 
0; 1
2

= 1. The other one is simply
symmetric. When station Y does not air a tune-in, equilibrium inferences are
(y; z) 2

(0; 1) ;

1
2
; 0

;

1
2
;
1
2

;

1
2
; 1

; (1; 0) ;

1;
1
2

; (1; 1)

.
With these inferences, provided that v is large enough,  = 1
4
will be the indi¤erent
viewer between sampling station Y and Z. Hence, those Y -viewers with  < 1
4
will
nd it optimal to switch to station Z while the rest will stay with Y upon observing
qY = 0. When y = 1 or z = 1, station Y surely cannot increase its audience size by
airing a tune-in. Thus, the only two scenarios Y may nd optimal to deviate and air a
tune-in are (y; z) =
 
1
2
; 0

and
 
1
2
; 1
2

. On the equilibrium path, Y gets an audience size
of 1
4
when y = 1
2
(from its own rst-period audience only): those who did not switch
away ( 2 1
4
; 1
2

) continue to stay with Y once they nd out y = 1
2
, and those who
have switched to Z ( < 1
4
) do not come back (when these viewers observe z = 0 or 1
2
,
they will infer that y 2 f1
2
; 1g, so none of them will ever switch back to Y ). Suppose Y
unexpectedly airs a tune-in for y = 1
2
. Under passive beliefs, viewers infer z 2 0; 1
2
; 1
	
following a deviation by Y and so only  < 1
4
  c
2
switch to station Z (as opposed to
 < 1
4
under the particular non-passive beliefs considered here). And the additional c
2
viewers are valuable enough to make deviation protable under passive beliefs (because
c
2
> 1
2A
). Hence, under passive beliefs, the described SPBE do not exist.
9
Suppose viewers hold non-passive o¤-equilibrium beliefs such that if Y unexpectedly
airs a tune-in for y = 1
2
, then they believe z 2 0; 1
2
	
. Under these beliefs, in case of a
deviation,  < 1
4
will switch to station Z. Thus, when (y; z) =
 
1
2
; 0

or
 
1
2
; 1
2

, station
Y ends up with the same audience size regardless of whether it airs a tune-in or not.
Therefore, deviation is clearly not optimal.
Does Y have any incentive to deviate from qY (0; 0) = qY
 
0; 1
2

= 1? On the equilib-
rium path, when station Y airs a tune-in for y = 0, equilibrium inferences are z 2 0; 1
2
	
.
Those Y -viewers with  < 1
4
will stay with Y while the rest will switch to Z (and will
not switch back to Y once they nd out z = 0 or 1
2
). On the other hand, if Y does not
air a tune-in, those Y -viewers with  2 1
4
; 1
2

will initially stay with Y while the rest
will switch to station Z. Once they nd out z = 0 or 1
2
, they will infer that y 2 f1
2
; 1g,
so none of them will ever switch back to Y . On the other hand, out of those who stayed
with Y , only those with   minv + c; 1
2
	
will stay, so station Y will get an audience
size of min

v + c; 1
2
	  1
4
(from its own rst-period audience only). Obviously, deviation
is protable if 1
4
  minv + c; 1
2
	  1
4
  1
2A
, or equivalently if v+c+ 1
2A
 1
2
. Otherwise,
the above strategies constitute an SPBE.
We again need v to be large enough for this SPBE to exist. If, in the absence of a tune-
in, a sizable fraction of viewers switch o¤ right away, then station Y will nd it optimal to
air a tune-in for y = 1
2
. To be more precise, when v  1
4
, if  2 1
4
; 1
4
+ 1
2A

switch o¤, then
Y will want to air a tune-in and keep all   1
4
watching. This happens when  = 1
4
+ 1
2A
switches o¤ in the absence of a tune-in: 3
7
 
v    1
2
  1
4
  1
2A

+ 1
7
 
v   1
4
  1
2A

+ 3
7
( c) <
0, or equivalently if v < 1
4
+ 3c
4
  1
4A
. Note that this threshold is less than 1
4
+ c
2
under
the large A assumption (i.e., A > 1
c
), so  = 1
4
+ 1
2A
does not sample Z even if she
samples Y and it turns out y = 1, as supposed in the above calculation. Hence, for any
v < 1
4
+ 3c
4
  1
4A
, it is optimal for station Y to deviate.
Note that the particular non-passive o¤-equilibrium beliefs that I used in the deriva-
tion of this SPBE are the most punishing o¤-equilibrium beliefs for the deviating station.
This is so because, whenever these beliefs are relevant (i.e., whenever station Y unexpect-
edly airs a tune-in for y = 1
2
or y = 1), deviation is unprotable. Hence, this particular
SPBE exists if and only if v + c+ 1
2A
< 1
2
.
10
Main result: Combining Lemmas 1-8 above, we reach the following conclusion: The
fully self-revealing SPBE always exists and is the unique SPBE under passive beliefs
when v < 1
4
+ c or when v  1
2
  c   1
A
, Otherwise, when 1
4
+ c  v < 1
2
  c   1
A
,
there exists a second SPBE, referred to as the cross-signaling SPBE in the text. When
o¤-equilibrium beliefs are unrestricted, there are three more SPBE: an SPBE with no
tune-ins, an SPBE in which only qY (0; 0) = qY
 
0; 1
2

= 1, and an SPBE in which only
qY
 
1
2
; 0

= qY
 
1
2
; 1
2

= 1. The rst of these exists when v + c + 1
A
 1
2
; this is the same
threshold where the cross-signaling SPBE ceases to exist. The second and third SPBE
exist when 1
4
+ 3c
4
  1
4A
 v < 1
2
  c  1
2A
.
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